Abstract. This paper uses demographic variation in savings behavior to provide evidence on US capital markets segmentation. Areas with a large fraction of seniors have higher local volumes of bank deposits. Since many banks rely heavily on deposit financing, this may affect their loan supply and hence local economic activity. Using the fraction of seniors as an instrument, I show a positive effect of local deposit supply on economic outcomes including the number of firms, the number of manufacturing firms, the fraction of small firms, and the number of new firms started. This supply is more important in industries that are heavily dependent on external finance. The base-line results are robust to variation in the definition of local market, and to the inclusion of controls for local wealth, as well as the use of lagged demographic variables. Finally, the deregulation of intrastate branching cut the effect of local deposit supply significantly, suggesting that a benefit of such deregulation is improved geographical capital allocation. (JEL G21, E22, R10) 
Introduction
In most economies, banks play a large role in the intermediation of capital from suppliers to users. Unlike financial markets, banks are principally local intermediaries. This applies to both sides of the balance sheet. On the liability side, banks rely heavily on deposits for funding (Kashyap and Stein (2000) ) and most deposits are local. On the asset side, much bank lending is local (Petersen and Rajan (2002) ). For these reasons, it is possible that local variation in the supply of deposits may translate to local variation in the availability and cost of capital for borrowers, and hence in the level of economic activity.
Geographical segmentation is difficult to identify empirically, however. A direct approach is to examine the correlation between local lending volumes and local economic outcomes. In practice, this approach suffers from a severe endogeneity problem since the volume of local bank lending is likely to respond to both supply and demand for loans. The demand for loans is trivially correlated with economic outcomes. Hence, to evaluate whether the local supply of capital affects local economic outcomes, a source of exogenous variation in the supply of bank loans is necessary. This paper utilizes demographic variation in the supply of deposits as precisely such a determinant of local capital supply. Seniors 1 tend to hold higher levels of bank deposits than other groups -both in absolute terms and as a fraction of portfolios. Since, on the other hand, seniors do not participate very much in the labor market, or operate businesses, and since they consume less than other groups, the impact of a large fraction of seniors on the local demand for business finance is likely to be small and perhaps negative. Hence, a large fraction of seniors in an area will cause a higher supply of intermediated finance relative to local demand for external financing. This makes the fraction of seniors a potentially useful instrument for the local supply of finance (relative to demand).
There is substantial demographic variation within the US, both across and within states. I use data on the fraction of seniors at the level of metropolitan statistical areas 2 to predict deposit 1 The term "seniors" is used to refer to the part of the population aged 65 and over. 2 MSAs are defined by the Office of Management and Budget as a Federal statistical standard. An area qualifies for recognition as an MSA if it includes a city of at least 50,000 inhabitants or an urbanized volumes and loan availability. This level of geographical detail permits including state fixed effects in regressions. Exploiting only within-state variation, I show that a high fraction of seniors corresponds to a high supply of deposits. In areas with high deposit supply, local banks use relatively more deposit financing (as opposed to equity and non-deposit debt) and have more liquid balance sheets (as measured by holdings of treasury securities).
Using seniors as an instrument for deposit supply, I show that this supply is related to local economic outcomes. MSAs with high levels of deposits have more firms, more manufacturing firms and establishments, relatively more small firms (0-19 employees) and fewer large firms (500+ employees), and more new firm starts. Using industry external finance dependence based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), I show that the effect of the local deposit supply is stronger in industries that are more externally dependent (i.e. those industries where large Compustat firms use more external financing on average).
I next go on to examine the robustness of these results to several possible concerns. To address the potential endogeneity of seniors, demographic predictions are used in the place of actual data on seniors (middle aged people 20-30 years in advance), and the results are nearly as strong. I next consider the possibility that the seniors variable is correlated with wealth, perhaps driving economic outcomes through an effect on demand. I attempt to control for wealth by including average local house prices and per capita income as control variables. This does not affect coefficient estimates very much, although sample size is reduced. To examine whether the market definition used (MSAs) is too wide, results are presented for smaller areas (zip codes). Smaller MSAs tend not to contain many zip codes, so I focus on the three largest cities (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago). Instrumented deposits have a positive effect the number of establishments. Finally, time series results, although exploiting very limited variation in the data (the fraction of seniors is very stable), finds a positive, borderlinesignificant effect of deposits on outcomes.
area of at least 50,000 with a total metropolitan area population of at least 100,000. MSAs typically incorporate several counties, and sometimes straddle state borders.
A final set of robustness tests address the issue of where integration is weakest, i.e. where local deposits have the strongest impact on local outcomes. There are multiple potential channels for geographical reallocation of savings, in either of the steps from depositor to intermediary and on to borrower. Furthermore, internal and external capital markets may allow funds to be transferred from bank branches in high deposit areas to branches with lower deposit supply (or higher loan demand). Frictions involving regulation, agency problems and information asymmetries may limit the scope for geographic transfers, however. In Section 6 of the paper, evidence is presented showing that deregulation of intrastate branching (see Kroszner and Strahan (1999) ) reduced the effects of geographical variation by approximately one third. This suggests that one of the important benefits of deregulation has been better geographical integration of capital markets.
Variation in the availability of capital in all likelihood implies welfare costs. If the marginal productivity of capital is declining, locations with a higher local supply of deposits will employ more capital, hence at a lower productivity, than locations with less capital, and aggregate output is reduced compared to a frictionless world. 3 The magnitude of welfare costs depends primarily on the rate at which capital productivity declines with capital intensity, and may vary by sector and over time.
A few caveats are in order. Bank lending data is not available by bank branch, so I cannot examine the effect of deposit supply on the composition and pricing of local loans. Second, time series variation is very limited for the fraction of seniors, so time series results must be considered provisional. This paper is related to papers showing that the supply of loans affects economic outcomes. Rosengren (1997, 2000) show that variation in Japanese banks' lending in the US, induced by Japanese economic events, has had a large effect on construction activity in California, Illinois and New York. Ashcraft (2003) shows that in two cases when the FDIC 3 Note that the welfare costs of varying capital supply are not as obvious for time series variation in the supply of loans, such as that induced by monetary policy. Cross-sectional variation, however, is almost certainly harmful.
closed healthy banks (to cover losses at affiliated banks), bank loans and local incomes declined. In contrast to these results, Driscoll (forthcoming) uses estimated state-specific shocks to the demand for money to instrument for loan supply and finds a positive relation to the volume of bank lending, but no effect on output. The results in this paper complement and expand on these findings in several ways. The instrument is more generally available, not depending on infrequent regulatory action (like the Texas bank closures) or specific foreign episodes (like the Japanese boom). This offers opportunities for broader uses, e.g. comparisons over time or international comparisons of financial systems. Also, the instrument is available at fine geographical levels (e.g. MSAs). This paper is also related to research showing that there is substantial within-country variation in financial systems. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) analyze variation in bank regulation across US states, and find that deregulation of entry and mergers substantially increased output growth rates. Cetorelli and Strahan (2004) report that, at the state level, the number of firms is more sensitive to bank competition in industries with high dependence on external financing.
In US data, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) use bank mergers as an instrument for local bank competition, and also find negative temporary effects on loan supply and economic activity following a bank merger. Using Italian data, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show that financial development 4 is largely determined by regulatory restrictions on bank entry. They find that financial development affects rates of entry, growth of firms (especially small firms) as well as product market competition.
My findings match this literature in suggesting that local credit markets matter for economic outcomes. However, the focus here is not on variation in local competitiveness and institutional quality, which affect the local extent of intermediation, but on geographical segmentation of capital markets, affecting the transfer of capital across space. The implications are therefore different. In particular, much of the literature has suggested that bank competition is beneficial and therefore implicitly or explicitly (e.g. Sapienza (2002) and Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) ) that mergers may be harmful. The evidence on segmentation 4 Guiso et al measure financial development as the probability that a household is shut off from the credit market, controlling for observables.
in fact suggests that a cost of a dispersed banking system is that geographical segmentation is exacerbated. Thus, there are potential welfare benefits of mergers that combine banks from different areas. The negative and positive welfare effects of mergers may coexist. Bank mergers that improve geographical integration may be beneficial while mergers that reduce local market competitiveness are detrimental. Some mergers may be detrimental in one respect and beneficial in the other.
Finally, my findings on deregulation are related to the results of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , who show large positive effects on state level growth rates after deregulation. Bank deregulation reduced the impact of local deposit supply, implying that geographical segmentation was reduced. This suggests a further channel through which the large economic effects identified may have come about.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the deposit holdings of seniors and their labor market participation. Section 3 discusses the conditions under which local deposits affect bank lending and those under which bank lending are likely to affect economic activity. Section 3 presents the data used, and Section 4 the basic empirical results. Section 5 introduces additional control variables and robustness tests, section 6 discusses what the results imply about the nature of financial frictions and presents some tests of frictions, and Section 7 concludes.
Seniors as an instrument for local capital supply
The empirical strategy in this paper entails using seniors as an instrument for local capital supply. This implies two main requirements on the consequences of local seniors. The measure of local capital supply is bank deposits (in local branches), so it is necessary that seniors have a positive effect on deposits. Second, for seniors to be a valid instrument for local capital supply it is paramount that the fraction of seniors not affect local capital demand. This section addresses the plausibility of these two assumptions in turn.
Loan supply: seniors tend to hold bank deposits
Seniors tilt their portfolios substantially toward deposits, and hold substantially higher levels of deposits than any other group. Using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) relative portfolio allocations are calculated for different age groups. For each age group, average and median portfolio shares of deposits out of total financial assets are reported. Figure 1 shows portfolio shares for each age group. Clearly, senior tilt their portfolios heavily toward deposits, more so than any other group except those less than 35 years (who have low total holdings of financial assets). In terms of absolute levels of deposits, seniors are the only age group where more than 90% of individuals held transaction accounts 5 , and where more than 20% held certificates of deposits in. Median holdings of certificates of deposits from various SCFs are reported in Table 1 . As expected, the holdings of seniors are higher than those of other age groups.
Loan Demand: seniors have low labor market participation and consumption
For the instrument to be valid, it is also important that seniors do not increase demand for loans. This probably holds since seniors produce and consume less than other age groups. 6 Seniors participate less in the labor force than other groups. The median retirement age in the US is about 62 years (Gendell and Siegel (1992) ). In 1997, the labor force participation of people aged 65-69 was 24.4%, of those aged 70-74 it was 13.5% and of those aged 75 or more, 5.3% (Wiatrowski (2001)). These numbers probably overstate the labor supply of seniors somewhat, since part-time work is common in older groups (51% of employed seniors according to Wiatrowski (2001) ). Also, seniors tend to be less active as entrepreneurs than other age groups. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) report that 10% of owners of private equity were 65 or older in the pooled 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances, while constituting about 13% of the overall population. Again, the level of activity conditional on participation is probably lower than for other age groups. Heaton and Lucas (2000) report that seniors hold a smaller fraction of their portfolio in proprietary business than other age groups (e.g. 2.4% of liquid assets for seniors vs. 6.8% for the 50-64 age group in 1995). Finally, seniors 5 For other forms of deposits (transaction accounts and savings accounts) the holdings are much smaller than for certificates, but again, the holdings of seniors are higher than those of other groups. The 75+ age group (with the highest holdings in both 1995 and 1998) had median transaction account holdings of $5.6 thousand 1995 and $6.1 in 1998. 6 It is not necessary (for the validity of the instrument) that seniors do not participate at all in the labor market. As long as seniors hold more deposits, in absolute terms, than non-seniors, banks will face a higher supply of deposits (relative to demand for financing) in areas with many seniors. This holds even if seniors work and consume as much as other age groups. Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
Crime rate data is collected from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports.
They refer to total volumes of property (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft) and violent crimes (murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) per 100,000 inhabitants. 9 Because property crimes are more numerous, the overall number is more closely correlated with property crime rates. The numbers were re-scaled (to make tables easier to read) so that the numbers represent crimes per 100 inhabitants.
Data by zip code on demographics, number of establishments and house prices are from the census for 2000 (establishment data is lagged three years). Table 2 
Bank financing and local seniors
This section examines the effect of seniors on bank balance sheets. Bank level data on balance sheets is collected for 1992 (the first year with data available) and related to 1990 seniors in the MSA where the bank is headquartered. I first examine single-MSA banks and then compare branches of multi-MSA banks. 9 A few MSAs lack rape data in 1980 and 1990, because their reporting was not consistent with UCR guidelines. These MSAs were given a score based on the other crime categories only (rapes are a very small fraction of crime compared to e.g. assault or burglary, so this affects the crime variable little).
The regressions presented in the first three columns of Table 3 relate the financing choices of single-msa banks 10 to the fraction of seniors in the local population, controlling for state fixed effects. Deposits constitute a larger fraction and equity a smaller fraction of financing when local deposit supply is high (i.e. many seniors). Debt is unaffected. This fits the findings of Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Bassett and Brady (2002) that only the largest banks use nondeposit debt financing to any significant extent. Single-MSA banks all fall in the size categories that use little or no outside debt. This universal absence of debt for smaller banks suggests that it is natural to find that the location of a bank does not affect debt financing. Importantly, single-MSA banks show no evidence of being able to offset demographic variation in deposit supply. The fourth column in Table 3 presents regression results for liquid securities holdings as a fraction of assets of unit banks located in an MSA. Holdings of treasury-issued US government securities are higher for unit banks located in MSAs with a high fraction of seniors (with errors clustered by MSA, the significance is better than 5%, but only just). Thus, bank liquidity seems to be positively affected by deposit supply.
Since multi-MSA banks face different deposit supply in different areas, there is no direct way to test their overall financing choices against local seniors. However, deposit holdings at the branch level may vary with local deposit supply. I relate deposit volumes at the branch level to deposit supply, controlling for institution fixed effects. In the fifth and sixth columns of Table 3 , branch level deposits of banks with a presence in more than one MSA are regressed on local seniors with and without state fixed effects. As with single-MSA banks there is a strong effect of seniors on deposits. An increase in seniors of one standard deviation (0.034) corresponds to an increase in branch level deposits of 5.3%. In the next column, institution fixed effects are included. The coefficient is slightly larger in this specification (a one standard deviation increase in seniors results in a 5.8% increase in deposits). These increases in deposits per branch might not add up to more deposits in an area if, for some reason, a high fraction of seniors were accompanied by relatively fewer bank branches. The last column in Table 3 reports an MSA-level regression of number of branches on local seniors. The effect of seniors on bank density is positive and highly significant. A one standard deviation increase in seniors corresponds to a 6.9% increase in the number of bank branches per capita.
The bank balance sheet and density results suggest that local deposit supply affects the local banking sector significantly. The next step is to relate this to local outcomes. Banks ability to reallocate capital (so as to reduce or offset the variation in deposit supply across locations) is revisited in Section 6. For the moment, notice that most small banks do not have access to nondeposit finance apart from equity, and that especially early in the sample, few banks had internal capital markets spanning multiple MSAs (the latter largely due to regulation). The next section uses the main data set of aggregate MSA-level variables to examine the effect of deposit supply on local economic outcomes.
Loan supply and economic outcomes
In this section, I show that deposits have a large positive effect on local economic outcomes.
The base-line regression is an IV regression with seniors used as an instrument for deposits.
The regression is run in a pooled panel with state-year interaction fixed effects. The fixed effects control for state-year-specific factors affecting the dependent variable. This implies that only within-state and -year variation in seniors is exploited, whereas all between-state variation is discarded. Because errors are clustered by MSA, allowing correlation between observations (i.e. years) within an MSA, any significant results are mainly driven by crosssectional variation.
First stage regression
Let H represent deposits, P a set of local controls, the index t the year of the observation and the index i an MSA and s(i) the state to which MSA i belongs. Finally, let S it be the fraction of seniors in the local population. The, first stage regressions are as follows:
H it = α + βS it + γP it + X t·s(i)
(1) Table 4 presents first stage regressions of deposits per capita on seniors (the fraction of the MSA's population that is 65 years and above) and state-year fixed effects. Based on the coefficient estimate in the first column, a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of seniors (0.034) corresponds to an 11% increase in deposits per capita. Columns two and three show that the effect of seniors on deposits holds for separate samples of large and small MSAs.
Column four and five show that the effect has declined over time (1990 and 2000 vs. 1970 and 1980) but that it remains significant in the later period. Columns six to nine successively include additional controls for city size (population) and local income and wealth (house prices). The fraction of seniors is highly significant in all specifications and adds between 6% and 10% to the R-squared (compared to a regression with dummies and controls only).
Economic outcomes: base-line
Second stage regressions test of whether the local loan supply matters for economic outcomes. I would like to text if the amount of investment and entrepreneurial activity responds to deposit supply. Data availability presents some limits to the exact tests, however. I use several alternative dependent variables. The first is the log of the number of firms, intended to capture the overall economic activity. Next, the fractions of firms that are small (<20 employees) and large (≥500 employees) are regressed on instrumented deposits. Small firms have few alternatives to bank loans for raising finance, and are likely to respond more to bank loan supply (see e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) ). For ex, Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue that external financing problems are likely to be most severe for small firms, for which information is likely to be scarce and "soft". Large firms can likely access bank loans further away, as well as market finance. Hence, deposits should be positively correlated with the fraction of small firms and negatively with the fraction of large firms. Firm size data is available for 1990 and 2000.
It is possible that seniors demand a different mix of local services than younger people, possibly involving a larger number of firms (e.g. restaurants and health care). For this reason, the number of manufacturing firms is used as a dependent variable, manufacturing firms being the least likely to reflect local demand conditions. The fraction of large manufacturing firms is also examined. Establishment level data is used as well, because it is available for all sample years. As a final dependent variable I use new firm starts. New firms are likely to be particularly dependent on local financial institutions since they lack the size and reputation of more established firms (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1995) ). 
where Y is an outcome variable, Ĥ instrumented deposits, P the log of population, the index t represents the year of the observation and the index i an MSA and s(i) the state to which MSA i belongs. All regressions include state-year interaction fixed effects X. 11 The first stage regression is similar to the specification in Table 4 , column six (but is estimated in different samples depending on data availability). The second stage works well for all outcome variables. The coefficients are highly significant and of the predicted sign. A one standard deviation increase in the log of deposits per capita (0.41 units) corresponds to a 13% increase in the number of firms; a 2.3 percentage point increase in the fraction of firms that are small (overall average 80.3%), a 0.9 percentage point drop in the fraction of firms that are large (overall average 6.8%), a 50% increase in the number of manufacturing firms, and an 21% increase the number of firms starts. These fairly large magnitudes indicate that the local deposit supply is an important determinant of local economic outcomes, especially affecting young and small firms.
Robustness and extensions
This section tackles several possible concerns with the base-line results. First, section 5.1 examines industry level data, offering verification that the effect of local deposit supply is largest in industries with high dependence on external finance. Second, section 5.2 addresses whether seniors are exogenous in relation to economic outcomes. Seniors are replaced by a lagged prediction of seniors, based on demographics. Third, Section 5.3 verifies that variation in local levels of wealth is unlikely to cause a serious omitted variable bias. Controls are added for local per capita income and house prices without affecting the results materially. Fourth, recent evidence suggests that MSAs may be too large to capture local bank markets. This is 11 The number of observations is slightly reduced because some MSAs do not belong to a single state and were excluded (e.g. Kansas City MSA contains counties in both Kansas and Missouri). An alternative procedure would be to apply both state dummies and including a dummy for multiple state-MSAs. I tried this method, with results similar to the base-line. especially relevant for the larger MSAs that contain millions of inhabitants and tens of thousands of firms. Section 5.4 presents results for narrower geographical areas. Finally, section 5.5 examines the time series evidence using changes in seniors.
Economic outcomes: industry variation
Firms in some industries are likely more dependent on external financing, such as bank loans, than others. Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
12 As argued by Rajan and Zingales, the financing choices of Compustat firms, which are large and likely to be the least financially constrained of all firms in the economy, is appropriate for capturing demand for financing. The first column in Table 6 shows that after controlling for industry and MSA fixed effects 14 , the interaction of bank deposits and external dependence has a positive and significant (10% level) effect on the number of establishments. The variable can be interpreted as follows: in an industry with external dependence one standard deviation (0.85) above the mean, the elasticity of the number of establishments with respect to local bank deposit supply is 0.18 higher (than at mean external dependence). The second and third columns present similar regressions for the alternative dependent variables --employees and sales -where coefficient estimates are slightly more statistically significant as well as somewhat larger.
There are more healthcare establishments where there are many seniors, presumably for reasons that have nothing to do with firm financing. This might affect the industry level results.
Column three therefore presents results for establishments when NAICS 62 (health care & social assistance) is excluded. Excluding this industry has virtually no effect on the estimated coefficient.
Finally, the last column of Table 6 uses the rank of industry external dependence instead of the actual number. The rank is less sensitive to outliers and to the particular details of estimated dependence, but relies exclusively on the industry order of external dependence. The ranking is from low to high, so that a positive interaction indicates that industries with higher external 14 Note that the fixed effects absorb almost all variation (the R-squared is above 0.9 and only slightly affected by including the interaction).
dependence are more responsive to deposit supply. The coefficient is positive and significant (10%) and implies a magnitude similar to the one estimated in the first column.
The regressions have controlled for MSA fixed effects, so omitted variables are unlikely to be a large concern in these regressions. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that industries which rely more on external financing for their investment are more sensitive to the local supply of deposits. This is consistent with a supply effect from seniors working through bank loans. It does not fit a "demand theory" of seniors (i.e. that seniors correlate with loan demand), unless financial dependence captures how industries' demand reacts to seniors, a priori a fairly remote possibility.
Mobility and the exogeneity of seniors
One possible concern with the results is reverse causality, i. Table 4 ). The second stage results, presented in Panel B, are similar in magnitude to the base line regression and have the same sign throughout. In three cases (the fraction of small and large firms as well as new firm starts) the coefficient on deposits retains its sign but loses significance. In the remaining three of the regressions (number of firms, manufacturing firms and manufacturing establishments), deposits are highly significant. This suggests that mobility does not drive the base-line results, and that reverse causality cannot explain the positive effect of instrumented deposits on outcomes.
Additional controls
One concern with the base-line results is that there is no control for variation in wealth across
MSAs. This concern is important for policy inferences. If seniors are wealthier than other groups, they may affect local loan demand rather than loan supply through their wealth. A city with more seniors experience relatively higher economic activity in order to serve the wealthdriven demand for locally produced goods or services. In this case, financial frictions do not affect the extent of geographical segmentation, so better regulation has no hope of improving the geographical allocation of capital. To rule out such a wealth-demand effect, I attempt to control for variation in local wealth levels.
Measuring wealth properly is obviously difficult, but some reasonable proxies are easy to identify. First, real estate prices are likely to reflect local wealth. I include the median price for residential single-family houses by MSA. This is measured as the log of median house prices. A second control is the log of per capita income, also likely to be related to local wealth levels.
House prices are only available for 2000 (income data is available for all years), so test are cross-sectional.
Results for all six dependent variables, with wealth controls, are presented in Table 8 . House prices and population are included as controls. The estimated effects of both wealth controls are significantly positive for firms. High house prices predict more firm starts, and income predicts larger firms. Controlling for wealth tends not to affect the magnitude and significance of the estimated effect of deposits. The estimated deposit coefficient is positive, similar to baseline results but always somewhat larger in magnitude. This suggests that the baseline results on deposits are not driven by omitted variable bias due to wealth. This conclusion isonly as strong as the quality of wealth controls. To the extent that wealth is not reflected in either house prices or incomes, we cannot rule out that senior wealth has some effect on local demand.
What is the relevant local market?
Previous research (e.g. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) , Petersen and Rajan (1995) ) has suggested that much bank lending is very local. MSAs may be too large to capture market size ideally. As a robustness test, it is therefore useful to look at a narrower market definition than MSA, avoiding the possible pooling of distinct markets into a single observation. For this purpose, I use deposits and demographic data at the zip code level. Many smaller MSAs intersect only one or two zip codes, but for larger cities, the number of zip codes may be in the hundreds. I therefore look at zip code results for New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, the MSAs cities with the largest populations. Counting all zip codes that cover any part of each greater city (based on the Census concept of a CMSA, larger than an MSA), but excluding all zip codes with less than 1000 residents, New York has 890, Los Angeles 505 and Chicago 340. At the zip-code level, very little economic information is available. The dependent variable is number of establishments. Income and median house values are used to control for wealth.
Results for zip codes are presented in Table 9 . The first stage (Table 9 , Panel A) shows that the fraction of seniors has a large positive effect on deposits whether or not local house values are controlled for. The estimated coefficients are slightly higher than the MSA-level numbers (see Table 4 ) and highly significant. This is what can be expected if zip codes correspond more closely to the geographical market for deposits. Table 9 , Panel B presents 2 nd stage regressions for the number of establishments. The estimated coefficient for deposits is consistently positive and significant, but of slightly smaller magnitude than for the number of firms at the MSA level. This is consistent with zip codes corresponding slightly less closely to local bank loan markets than MSAs, but still capturing a large part of the local market.
Time series results
If the level of deposits affects economic outcomes, it is natural to ask if changes in deposits affect changes in economic outcomes. Looking at changes instead of has the advantage that any MSA-level factors which are constant are differenced out. Unfortunately, the empirical approach used here is ill suited to first-difference tests. Since the fraction of seniors is so stable, identification based on changes in the fraction uses a very marginal source of variation. Even at ten-year intervals, the correlation of the fraction in consecutive cross-sections is 0.92. To and for which demographic data and bank deposits is available for both years). 
where ∆Y is the change in the log of the number of manufacturing establishments 1970-2000, ∆Ĥ is the change of deposits instrumented by the change in seniors, ∆P is the change of log of population, X is a state dummy, and the index i represents an MSA and s(i) the state to which MSA i belongs. After dummies have been included, there is limited variation left to test for the effect of changes in deposit volumes. Column one presents the results. The coefficient on deposits is significant at the 11% level, and similar in magnitude than the cross-sectional estimates. The second column includes changes in per capita income as a control. The estimated coefficient for income is insignificant. Deposits are now significant at the 10% level with a positive coefficient of 1.52. The implied effect of a one standard deviation increase of the change in log bank deposits per capita (0.32 for the three decades) is a 62% increase in the number of establishments, corresponding to a difference in annual growth rates of 1.6%.
Because changes in seniors are small, this test has limited power. An additional instrument might therefore be useful. One possibility is to use the initial level of seniors in 1970, which is useful if the level of seniors has not always completely affected deposits and lending, due to some kind of lag. In the last two columns of Table 10 the change in bank deposits is instrumented with the initial level of seniors as well as the change. Now the effect of deposits is estimated to be significant (at the 10% or 5% level depending on whether income changes are included as a control). Despite the limited information available for the time series, these results support the cross-sectional conclusion that deposits have a positive effect on the local economy. As pointed out in the introduction, there are several ways in which capital can be moved geographically: firms borrowing from banks far away or non-bank financing; banks using financing that is less local than deposits (e.g. public equity and bonds markets); and transfers between branches of a bank present in multiple areas (internal capital markets). The following sub-sections each discuss various modes of reallocation, examine predictions for where local deposits are likely to be most important, and discuss the extent to which each prediction is consistent with the findings reported above. Finally, the substantial US bank deregulation over the last few decades is used to test whether regulation has been a source of geographical frictions.
Firm financing
The literature on what is called the "credit channel" of monetary policy transmission has emphasized the different ways in which bank lending is special as a source of firm financing (i.e. does not have close substitutes). The implication is that firms cannot easily replace absent bank loans with alternative financing. The evidence on bank loan supply is largely based on time series variation in lending. 15 In cross-sectional tests, Peek and Rosengren (1997) as well as Ashcraft (2003) suggest that local economies can be substantially affected by lending, suggesting that alternative financing is not available for an economically important subset of firms.
Even if banks constitute the sole possible source of external finance for most firms, could they not borrow from far-away banks? The evidence presented by Petersen and Rajan (2002) suggests that perhaps not. They show that distances between US borrowers and lenders are increasing, but that distances generally remain short even in later years. In their sample, the median distance between borrower and bank is 2 miles for lending relationships started in 1973-79, 4 miles for relationships started in 1980-89, and 5 miles for relationships started in 1990-93. Brevoort and Hannan (2004) suggest that distance may be of increasing importance in U.S. commercial lending. These results suggest that for many firms, borrowing at a distance is still expensive or impossible, consistent with geographical segmentation. Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that banks in general, and banks below the 75 th percentile by asset size in particular, rely very heavily on deposit financing: "the smallest banks have a very simple capital structure -they are financed almost exclusively with deposits and common equity". Houston, James and Marcus (1997) find that the lending of bank holding companies is linked to the internally generated cash and available capital, i.e. they are liquidity constrained.
Bank financing
Driscoll (forthcoming) also confirms banks' dependence on deposits: he finds that shocks to deposit volumes affect lending at both the state and regional levels. While small and mediumsized banks are heavily dependent on deposits, large banks have better access to marketmediated finance. This suggests that the local supply of deposits is most important when banks are small. Similarly, banks that are not listed on a stock exchange likely face more obstacles to equity financing. 16 However, it seems reasonable to predict that areas with many listed banks are less subject to the constraints of local deposit supply.
Multi-MSA banks
One possible channel for geographic reallocation of capital is transfers between branches of the same bank. In 1980, more than half of all US banks were unit banks (had only one branch), in 1990 a little less than half were unit banks, and in 2000, about a third of all banks were unit banks. These unit banks have no ability to transfer funds to other locations through internal capital markets. Of multi-branch banks, about 25% had branches in only one MSA in 2000. For 16 Even banks listed on stock exchanges face costs of issuing equity. For the fact that firms are reluctant to issue equity, see Welch (2004) . For evidence that bank stock prices fall when they issue equity, see Slovin et al (1991) . The cost of issuing equity could be due to asymmetric information as in Myers and Majluf (1984) . bank companies with a presence in several MSAs, there are legal constraints on transfers between branches. 17 Organizational reasons not to transfer funds from deposit-rich to depositpoor areas may exist as well. For example, it may be optimal to allow a certain local discretion in capital allocation decisions, as in the model of Stein (2002), which is likely to limit the extent of transfers across branches. Recent empirical work has gone some way toward identifying the extent to which internal capital markets are active in banks, at least on the year-to-year margin. Houston et al (1997) , Houston and James (1998) and Campello (2002) all find that lending by banks with access to internal capital markets is less constrained. These findings suggest that MSAs where banks are local will be more exposed to local deposit supply than MSAs with many multi-MSA banks.
Empirical results on the regulatory nature of frictions
The overview of channels of geographical reallocation suggest that large banks generally are likely to have better access to reallocation than small banks, both non-deposit external financing and internal capital markets. Using this prediction empirically is complicated by the potential endogeneity of bank size. The size of local banks is likely not exogenous to the local economic environment.
To test the whether access to internal and external capital markets affects segmentation, I employ an empirical strategy using regulation. I exploit the timing of bank deregulation, as reported in Kroszner and Strahan (1999) , to identify the regulatory limits to the creation of banks with internal capital markets spanning several cities (and states). Starting around 1970, US states deregulated their bank markets in several stages, first allowing mergers, later intrastate branching, and finally cross-state border banking. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) identify the most important step as allowing within state bank mergers, which for the first time allowed integration of branch networks. This deregulation happened at different rates in 17 Banks with multiple branches (or bank holding companies with multiple banks) face regulatory limits to transfers between branches, through the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), "intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate" different states, before 1970 in some states, at some later point in some states, and not until the federal deregulation of 1994 in a few. 18 I test if the local capital supply had a larger effect on the local economy pre-deregulation that post. To do this, I interact a dummy for state-years where intrastate mergers are deregulated with local bank deposits. I also use an alternative regulation dummy equal to one if all three of Kroszner and Strahan's deregulation steps were implemented in a state. Most of the variation in deregulation is early in my sample, so the only dependent variable used for this set of regressions is manufacturing establishments, which is available starting in 1970. Table 11 presents the results of IV regressions including the interaction of deregulation with deposits, controlling for MSA and year fixed effects. In column one, the effect of deposits is significant and positive, and the interaction of deposits with deregulation is negative and significant, as expected. The magnitude is cut by about a third after deregulation (from 0.69 to 0.44). Column two presents a specification including population and income controls. Again, the interaction is significant and negative, approximately one third the size of the pre-deregulation coefficient.
These results suggest that intrastate bank deregulation was associated with reductions in the segmentation of capital markets. A plausible interpretation is that deregulation caused a better geographical allocation of capital by expanding internal and external capital markets. In related research, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that branching deregulation raised annual growth rates of state personal income by between 0.5% and 1%. They suggest that deregulation increased loan quality through more active markets for corporate control or better management discipline. My results point to another channel -deregulation leading to reduced geographical segmentation. This is consistent with the findings of Jayaratne and Strahan that deregulation was beneficial for state economies. The relative contribution of these effects cannot be assessed from my results. 18 Kroszner and Strahan (1999) discuss the political economy of this deregulation. As long as the decision to deregulate was not driven by future reductions in segmentation for non-regulatory reasons, we can consider it an exogenous change.
The tests of where local capital supply matters most suggest that geographical segmentation varies substantially. Banks with access to external and internal capital markets reduce the effect of local capital supply. Intrastate banking deregulation significantly decreased the effect of segmentation. What share of improved integration is due to internal vs. external capital markets is not clear from these results, and remains an important topic for future research.
Conclusions
I use the fraction of seniors as an instrument for the local supply of deposits, and hence of bank loans. The supply of deposits affects economic outcomes: when deposits are high due to demographic reasons, there are more firms, especially small, both overall and in manufacturing, as well as more new firms. The results are robust to several alternative specifications: using demographic predictions of future senior numbers, including controls for local wealth, reducing area size from MSA to zip code. Time series evidence based on changes in seniors, though based on limited variation, also supports the main cross-sectional findings.
If capital has a declining marginal productivity at the MSA level, the welfare implications of variations in the supply of capital to firms are negative. Capital will be used at lower marginal productivity in locations with higher loan supply, whereas in a frictionless world, this capital could be reallocated to a different location with higher marginal productivity of capital.
Bank deregulation has been shown to have positive effects on economic outcomes (see e.g. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) ). In terms of mechanisms, the focus has been on bank competition. My results suggest that the effect of bank deregulation on geographical allocation of capital may be important as well. I estimate that the effect of local deposit supply on the local economy is a third weaker after deregulation than before it. This suggests that US state-level deregulation reduced geographical segmentation (perhaps through increased bank size improving access to internal and external capital markets). This improved geographical allocation may well have important welfare benefits. This conclusion has important regulatory implications. A banking system with small and fragmented institutions geographically large countries and in countries with substantial geographical variation in the supply of capital, as well as in economies where deposit-financed institutions play a large role in financial intermediation.
Several extensions of these results would illuminate the effect of capital market segmentation.
First, along the lines of Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Campello (2002) , are banks in low deposit areas more exposed to monetary shocks? Second, after deregulation, are areas with many small, local banks more exposed to local deposit supply? Third, does the local deposit supply affect loan pricing and the capital structure for local firms?
19 See e.g. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) for evidence that bank consolidation varies dramatically between developed countries, and affects industry growth rates. Change in number of manufacturing establishments (log) R-squared n/a n/a n/a n/a N 146 146 146 146 
